Job rotation as a learning mechanism by Ortega, Jaime
Job Rotation as a Learning Mechanism
Jaime Ortega
Department of Business Administration, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid,
28903 Getafe, Madrid, Spain
jortega@emp.uc3m.es
This article analyzes the costs and benefits of job rotation as a mechanism with which thefirm can learn about the employees’ productivities and the profitability of different jobs
or activities. I compare job rotation to an assignment policy where employees specialize in
one job along their career. The gains from adopting a job rotation policy are larger when
there is more prior uncertainty about employees and activities. I argue that this firm learning
theory fits the existing evidence on rotation better than alternative explanations based on
employee motivation and employee learning.
(Job Rotation; Learning )
1. Introduction
Recent surveys have revealed that job rotation is used
by a significant and increasing number of companies
in the United States and other OECD countries. A
1992 U.S. survey by Osterman (1994) reported that
26% of establishments had more than a half of their
core employees involved in job rotation. A later sur-
vey by the same author shows that this percentage
had increased up to 50% by 1997 (Osterman 2000).
Gittleman et al. (1998) reported that 24% of estab-
lishments with more than 50 employees and 12% of
all establishments in their sample used job rotation.
More recently, similar evidence has also become avail-
able from other OECD countries (OECD 1999), and
the effects of this practice and other human resource
innovations on performance are being documented
(Ichniowsky et al. 1996, 1997, 1999). Two explanations
are usually given to explain job rotation (Campion
et al. 1994). Some argue that it is beneficial because it
fosters employee learning and increases human cap-
ital accumulation. According to this view, rotation
gives managers exposure to a variety of experiences
and may in this way contribute to their professional
development. Others argue that job rotation increases
motivation. Rotation is viewed as a mechanism to
reduce the employees’ boredom and to keep them
interested in their job. Both the “employee learning”
and the “employee motivation” theories emphasize
the effects of job rotation on employees’ actions. In
this article I argue that the empirical evidence on
rotation is not completely consistent with these theo-
ries. To better understand the existing empirical evi-
dence, I propose a shift of attention toward the effect
of rotation on firm learning, i.e., on the effectiveness
with which the employer learns about its employ-
ees. I argue that firm learning can better account for
the existing empirical evidence than the alternative
explanations mentioned above.
Job rotation has important implications for firm
learning. On one hand, when employees rotate, the
firm receives information about the quality of vari-
ous job-employee matches, as in Jovanovic (1979). On
the other hand, without rotation, the firm receives
only direct information about one match, but the
information it gets about this one match is very reli-
able. Thus there is a trade-off between the variety
and the number of signals available to the firm for
a given employee (Meyer 1994). Moreover, at times
the firm may want to learn not only how well dif-
ferent employees match different jobs, but also how
profitable different jobs are. This is particularly rele-
vant for companies where innovative production pro-
cesses are being implemented or new products are
being launched. In these cases, we might think that
rotation makes it more difficult for the firm to learn
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whether observed productivity differentials between
jobs are a result of job-specific or employee-specific
components. A policy involving little job rotation, on
the other hand, could be the best way to learn about
the job-specific component. But it could also be that
rotation makes it easier to identify the job-specific
components.
In this article I use a statistical learning model to
examine these questions. I consider a firm where there
is uncertainty about the productivity of different per-
sons at different jobs and about the profitability of dif-
ferent jobs or activities. The firm would like to learn
as much as possible in these dimensions to optimally
match employees to jobs. Within this framework, I
compare two different job assignment policies: A “job
rotation” policy, where employees perform a differ-
ent job in every period, and a “specialization” policy,
where each employee is assigned a job at the start
and keeps doing this job in subsequent periods. The
firm is assumed to choose one of these two allocation
policies and commit to it. I study in which cases the
firm should adopt one policy or the other.
Empirical evidence on job rotation is scant and
must be taken with caution. However, there seem
to be two interesting facts. First of all, the empiri-
cal evidence suggests that there is a negative correla-
tion between the frequency with which an employee
rotates and tenure. Second, the empirical studies of
rotation suggest a positive correlation between rota-
tion and the use of new technologies. Using personnel
data from the finance department of a large pharma-
ceutical corporation, Campion et al. (1994) found that
the average employee rotated once every two years
approximately and that a 1% increase in tenure pro-
duced a 16% reduction in the frequency of rotation.
On the other hand, Gittleman et al. (1998) found that
the probability that the average firm in their sample
used rotation was 9.6% if the firm was not using a
new technology and increased to 22.3% if the firm had
introduced a new technology during the sample year.
The fact that younger employees rotate more often
seems at odds with a motivation theory of job rota-
tion: Newer employees are usually more motivated,
and we should therefore expect to observe higher
rotation rates when employees have more tenure in
the firm. The employee learning theory seems a better
explanation: Since newer employees have more to
learn, they should rotate more often. However, I argue
that the employee learning theory is not necessar-
ily consistent with the positive correlation between
innovation and rotation: According to the employee
learning theory, an employee should rotate when he
has already learned enough about a job; but if a
firm has recently adopted a new technology, it should
take employees more time to learn about their cur-
rent assignments. Since employees will not rotate
until they have learned their current assignments
well, we should expect the rate of rotation to be
lower, not higher, when a new technology has recently
been adopted. This may contradict the evidence that
innovation and job rotation are positively correlated.
The firm learning theory that I propose seems
easier to reconcile with the facts. Suppose firms were
using rotation to learn more about different employ-
ees and activities: Firms could be rotating juniors
more frequently than seniors because the abilities of
the latter are better known; and rotation could be
more profitable when new technologies are intro-
duced because in that case the firm knows less about
the profitability of different activities. In this article
I use a learning model to study whether this intu-
ition is true: Does the firm learn relatively more with
rotation when employees and technologies are newer?
I show that this is indeed the case. As the uncer-
tainty regarding employees and activities increases,
the relative gains from adopting a job rotation policy
increase. First of all, I show that job rotation out-
performs specialization as a learning device, i.e., job
rotation is more profitable than specialization from a
learning point of view. This is consistent with earlier
work by Meyer (1994). Second, I show that the rela-
tive gains from a job rotation policy are higher when
the initial uncertainty about employees is greater
(e.g., recently hired employees). Third, I show that
these gains are higher when the initial technologi-
cal uncertainty is higher. Last, I show that the gains
are higher when measurement errors are smaller. The
first two results can be explained by the fact that
the firm always learns more from the first observa-
tions of an employee than from subsequent observa-
tions. A job rotation policy, where employees move
frequently, exploits this feature of learning better than
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a specialization policy. The third result is due to the
fact that a job rotation policy protects the firm’s learn-
ing process from technological uncertainty. If techno-
logical uncertainty is not employee-specific, its effect
on productivity is differenced out by comparing the
performance of two different employees in the same
job. The more rotation a firm uses, the better this
can be done. Finally, the fourth result is better under-
stood by considering the extreme case where there
are no measurement errors. In that case, it suffices to
observe an employee once in a certain job to perfectly
learn the value of this job-employee match: Addi-
tional observations do not add anything. Hence job
rotation must be more profitable than specialization. I
show that, as measurement errors increase, the gains
from rotation become smaller and smaller.
2. Assumptions and Related
Literature
Job rotation is an interesting mechanism because it
makes it possible for the firm to observe employees
in action in different positions and thus learn which
job fits each employee best. Any meaningful analy-
sis of the problem should therefore take into account
that there are significant differences among jobs. This
has two different implications. First of all, we should
take into account that the employees’ human capital
is—at least partly—job specific. Thus throughout the
paper I assume that the productivity of an employee
at a given job depends on his job-specific human cap-
ital, which the firm would like to learn. The firm
may use job rotation to learn what the best job for
each employee is. The second implication is that the
surplus generated by different jobs might vary irre-
spectively of the employees involved. Some activi-
ties are intrinsically more productive than others, are
better equipped with physical capital, or are more
demanded. These differences, however, must also be
learned by the firm.
Another important element of the problem is that
it is costly to continuously reevaluate job assign-
ments. The information flows that a firm receives
about its own employees might be very frequent,
but job changes must necessarily be less frequent:
Employees cannot be reallocated every time the firm
learns something new about them. The problem for
the firm, therefore, is to decide whether employ-
ees should rotate between two consecutive job eval-
uations. Firms using job rotation are firms where
employees have to move horizontally before they are
reevaluated. And firms that do not use job rotation are
firms where employees only change jobs when they
are reevaluated. Thus in my model I assume that, for
some time, the firm has to assign jobs in a predeter-
mined way (either rotating employees or not). Only
then can the firm use the information it has learned
to modify job assignments.
My article is mostly related to the seminal job
matching article of Jovanovic (1979) and to Miller
(1984). As in the job matching literature, I con-
sider an environment where the job specificity of
human capital plays an important role, and jobs and
employees have to be matched in the best way pos-
sible. Some employees might be better than others at
some jobs, but the productivities of employees at dif-
ferent jobs can only be learned if employees try such
jobs: Jobs are experience goods. However, there are
also some differences with the job matching literature.
Whereas the job matching framework can in prin-
ciple be applied both to inter- and intrafirm mobil-
ity (turnover and rotation, respectively), my focus is
on intrafirm mobility: I wish to study whether job
rotation policies are an efficient way to learn about
one’s employees. To pursue this study, I compare a job
rotation policy, where employees have to move hor-
izontally before being evaluated, to a specialization
policy, where employees do not move until they are
evaluated. This approach differs from the job match-
ing literature because in that literature job changes
only take place whenever some piece of new, relevant
information is learned. In my model, on the contrary,
employees change jobs according to a predetermined
pattern, and then the firm evaluates the information it
has learned to improve job assignments. If employees
rotate only when new information is learned, rota-
tion would of course be preferable to no rotation.
However, if rotation patterns are predetermined,
there is no obvious reason why rotation should be
superior. The aim of this article is to analyze this
question.
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My basic modeling choices are taken from Meyer
(1994). However, the topic of my article is job rotation
rather than team composition, and there are, as a con-
sequence, some key differences. First, all human cap-
ital in my model is job specific, whereas in Meyer’s
(1994) all human capital is general. As I have argued,
the job-specificity of human capital must be accounted
for because firms are interested in rotating employees
to see which job fits each of them best. The notion
of job-employee fit is meaningful if human capital is
job specific. Second, in Meyer (1994) the productiv-
ity of employees in different jobs depends on their
human capital but does not depend on job character-
istics. Instead, I assume that some jobs may be more
profitable than others independently of the allocation
of employees.
3. Model and Results
3.1. Set-up
Consider a firm where two persons are employed
at two different jobs. To abstract from problems due
to team production and keep the symmetry of the
problem throughout the analysis, suppose each job
has to be performed by only one person at a time,
and each person can perform only one job at a time.
Thus the firm has to decide who works where at each
period. Suppose also that the two employees work for
two periods in the firm, and that after that the firm
decides to reassign jobs to maximize expected prof-
its. The surplus generated by each activity depends
on two factors: The productivity of the employee the
job has been assigned to and the profitability of the
activity itself. Both are assumed to be constants and
are unknown to both the firm and the employees. Let
subscripts i ∈ AB and k ∈ 12 denote employees
and jobs, respectively, and assume that activity k’s
production function in period t ∈ 12 is
ykt = 
ik+k+kt (1)
where 
ik + k is the expected productivity of
employee i in job k and kt is a productivity shock.
The term 
ik denotes the part of employee i’s human
capital that is specific to job k. All job-specific human
capital is assumed to be firm specific as well. I assume
that there is a competitive labor market that learns
about the employees’ general human capital at the
same speed as the firm itself. As a consequence, there
is no need to introduce a general human capital term
in Equation (1), and the value of the firm is assumed
to depend only on the levels of specific human and
nonhuman capital, as well as an exogenous shock.
The level of nonhuman capital that is needed in job
k is represented by k, and the a priori beliefs about
all productivity components are assumed to be nor-
mally distributed: Specifically, I assume that 
ik ∼
N02
, k ∼ N0
2
 , and kt ∼ N0
2
 . For sim-
plicity I assume that all these variables are a priori
independently distributed. This assumption is relaxed
in §3.3.
3.2. Job Assignment Policies
Ideally, an optimal job assignment policy would
require the firm to reallocate jobs whenever new
information alters the existing ranking of job-
employee matches. Jobs would have to be reallo-
cated as frequently as such new information would be
learned. There are, however, limits to the frequency
with which a company can afford to undertake such
reallocations. One limit is that it is costly to move
employees around: Employees have to adapt to new
responsibilities, learn to work with new people, or
spend time training their successors. Second, the pro-
cess of evaluating new information to assess which
reallocations are more profitable is also costly. Last, an
allocation policy that is very sensitive to new infor-
mation might create an incentive for employees to
exert influence activities (Milgrom 1988) and to try to
manipulate such information. Let R and S be the
values of firms following a job rotation and a special-
ization policy, respectively. The gain from adopting a
job rotation policy is =R−S . We should expect a
job rotation policy to be adopted when  > C, where
C are the above-mentioned costs of implementing job
rotation. To focus on the learning aspects of both poli-
cies, I assume that C is exogenous and try to char-
acterize the firms for which it is more likely to have
 > C. We begin by computing S and R.
3.2.1. Specialization. I consider a specialization
policy first: Each employee performs the same job for
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two consecutive periods. I use this as a benchmark
to compare a job rotation policy to. Without loss of
generality I assume that employee A is assigned Job 1
and employee B is assigned Job 2, and therefore
y1t=
A1+1+1t
y2t=
B2+2+2t
(2)
for t = 12. The firm’s expected value in this case is
S = E0
[
maxE2
A1+1+E2
B2+2
E2
B1+1+E2
A2+2
]
 (3)
where Et· is the expectation operator conditional
on all information available at the end of period t.
In principle, we would have to add to this expres-
sion the value of the surplus generated in Periods
1 and 2, while the firm is learning. However, the
expected value of this surplus will be the same for
the specialization and the rotation policies, because
all employees and jobs have been assumed to be
ex ante identical. Note also that, because of special-
ization, there is one dimension of each employee’s
human capital that the firm learns nothing about.
Hence E2
A2= E0
A2= 0 and E2
B1= E0
B1= 0.
As a consequence this expression simplifies to
S = E0
[
maxE2
A1+E2
B20
]
 (4)
By specializing, the firm chooses to learn a lot
about a few dimensions instead of learning a little
about more dimensions. Expression (4) is simply the
expected value of a truncated normal variable and the
following result can be easily proven:
Lemma 1. The expected value of the specialization
policy is
S =
√
2

(
4

2 +22
+22
)1/2
 (5)
Proof. See Appendix.
The expected value of a specialization policy is
decreasing in 2 . Note that the value of each assign-
ment policy depends on how much the firm learns
about its employees. When 2 is high, there is little
learning and, as a consequence, the value of the
firm is lower. On the other hand, the value of
specialization is increasing in 2
 because, when 
2

 is
higher, there is more information to be learned on the
employee dimension, and the value of any policy that
allows learning in that dimension should be higher.
We will later see that the value of job rotation is
also decreasing in 2 and increasing in 
2

. Finally,
specialization has a lower value when there is more
prior uncertainty regarding the profitability of differ-
ent jobs. This is so because the uncertainty regard-
ing the job-specific component of productivity (the s)
simply adds more noise to the inference of individual
abilities.
3.2.2. Job Rotation. Suppose now that the firm
follows a job rotation policy: Each employee works
at a different job in each of the two periods. Without
loss of generality, suppose A starts doing Job 1 and
is then moved to Job 2, whereas B starts at Job 2 and
is then moved to Job 1. The production technology is
then
y11=
A1+1+11
y21=
B2+2+21
y12=
B1+1+12
y22=
A2+2+22
(6)
At the end of Period 2, each employee has worked
in each job once, jobs are optimally reassigned, and
the ex-ante value of the firm is
R = E0
[
maxE2
A1+1+E2
B2+2
E2
B1+1+E2
A2+2
]
 (7)
This is the expected value of the maximum of two
correlated normal variables. The following lemma is
proved in the appendix:
Lemma 2. The expected value of the job rotation policy
is
R =
√
2

(
4

2 +2

)1/2
 (8)
Proof. See Appendix.
As in the specialization case, the value of the firm
is decreasing in 2 and increasing in 
2

. The intuition
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is the same as in the specialization case: The value
of the firm under a job rotation policy is lower when
abilities are more difficult to measure and is higher
when the initial information about the employees is
less precise (and hence there is more to be learned
by having them rotate). On the other hand, the value
of job rotation does not depend on the job-specific
component of productivity ( 2 ). This is so because,
with rotation, the firm can eliminate the effect of tech-
nological, job-specific uncertainty on productivity by
simply comparing the performance of two different
employees at the same job. In other words, with job
rotation the firm can better use relative performance
evaluation.
3.2.3. Comparison. Now consider the profit dif-
ferential between the two human resource practices,
=R−S .
Proposition 1. For every value of 2 , 
2

, and 
2
 the
profit differential  is strictly positive, increasing in 2

and 2 , and decreasing in 
2
 .
Proof. See Appendix.
The result that  > 0 means that, from a learning
point of view only, job rotation outperforms special-
ization. This result is consistent with Meyer’s (1994)
argument that, in her model, the introduction of
job rotation would improve learning. This result is
because the firm always learns more from the first
observation of a particular job-employee match than
from subsequent observations. With a job rotation pol-
icy, every time the firm learns something, it learns it
for the first time. On the other hand, with a specializa-
tion policy the firm learns twice for the first time (in
Period 1) and twice for the second time (in Period 2).
The result with respect to 2 is straightforward: With
a job rotation policy, the uncertainty about the job
component of productivity has no effect on learning.
This effect can be differenced out by undertaking rel-
ative performance evaluation. However, 2 has a neg-
ative effect on learning if the firm is following a spe-
cialization policy for reasons already explained.
The other two results are less evident: Both R and
S are decreasing in 2 and increasing in 
2

. To get
some intuition about this, first look at the case where
2 would be zero, i.e., a hypothetical situation where
there would be no measurement errors. In this kind
of situation, after Period 1 ended the firm would have
already learned all it could have learned about the
initial job allocation. Since there would be nothing
more to learn, it would be better to have employees
rotate in the second period. If we now took a slightly
higher value of  2 , job rotation would still be more
profitable than specialization, but it would be a little
bit less profitable than before. The proof shows that
this intuition extends to all values of 2 : The profit
differential is decreasing in 2 . Finally, consider the
comparative statics with respect to 2
. The values of
both allocation policies are increasing in 2
 because
both policies allow the firm to learn more, and the
value of learning is higher when the prior uncertainty
is higher. However, the value of job rotation is more
sensitive to the initial level of uncertainty because,
with this policy, every piece of information that the
firm learns is completely new: Every observation that
the firm has access to refers to a dimension for which
the firm did not have any information other than its
prior beliefs.
3.3. Correlated Abilities
In reality, the productivities of a same employee in
different jobs are likely to be positively correlated:
An employee who performs well in one of the jobs
is likely to perform well in other jobs too. To take
this into account I now assume that the covariance
between 
i1 and 
i2 is equal to  > 0 for every i ∈
AB. I keep all other assumptions unchanged. We
can follow the same steps as before and find that the
expected value of a specialization policy is
S =
√
2

2
−√
2 +22
+2 
 (9)
Details are given in the Appendix. As in Lemma 1,
the value of specialization is decreasing in 2 and 
2

and increasing in 2
. The reasons for these results are
similar to the ones for the case where  = 0. Besides,
we can now see the effect on  of the positive correla-
tion of abilities. An increase in this correlation reduces
the gains from a specialization policy. The reason for
this is that, when there is a higher positive correla-
tion, there is less to be learned with either policy (as
shown below, the value of rotation is also decreasing
in ).
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The expected value of the job rotation policy is
R =
√
2

2
−√
2 +2
−
 (10)
This also shows the robustness of our previous find-
ings: The value of specialization does not depend
on 2 and is decreasing in 
2
 , increasing in 
2

 and
decreasing in  . The reasons are similar to the ones
discussed above.
As shown in the appendix, comparative statics of
 are also robust to the positive correlation of abili-
ties. I prove that  is strictly positive, increasing in 2

and 2 , and decreasing in 
2
 . This means that all the
qualitative predictions of the model with uncorrelated
abilities remain unchanged in the correlated case.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
At present, empirical evidence on job rotation needs
to be taken with caution because it is not complete.
However, the predictions we have derived are consis-
tent with the evidence we have at this point. Using
a 1993 sample of over 5,800 U.S. establishments from
all industries, Gittleman et al. (1998) found that firms
using new technologies were significantly more likely
to use job rotation. Unpublished results obtained for
their paper reveal that an average establishment in
their sample had a 9.6% probability of using job rota-
tion, whereas an average establishment that had intro-
duced a new technology during the sample year had
a 22.3% probability. My model shows that job rotation
is in fact a better learning mechanism than specializa-
tion when there is little prior information about the
relative profitability of different activities. The pre-
diction that rotation is more profitable than special-
ization when employees are in their early careers is
also consistent with the empirical evidence, although
in this case the empirical evidence is less representa-
tive. Campion et al. (1994) used personnel data from
the finance department of a single large corporation
that was using rotation extensively. They found that
the frequency of rotation drastically diminished with
tenure.
As I mentioned before, two other explanations
have been given for the use of job rotation. Accord-
ing to the employee motivation theory, firms make
employees rotate to reduce their boredom and make
them more interested in their work. Despite its intu-
itive appeal, this theory seems at odds with the avail-
able empirical evidence. It seems that more innovative
firms use more job rotation. However, in a company
where more innovative practices are implemented the
nature of jobs is newer and employees are less likely
to be bored. In these cases employees are required to
understand and solve new problems even if they stay
at their jobs. Moreover, it is usually thought that moti-
vational problems are more likely to arise rather late
in the employees’ careers. As a consequence, if rota-
tion was mostly playing a motivational role we would
expect employees with more tenure to rotate more
than those with less tenure. However, the empirical
evidence suggests that the correlation between tenure
and rotation is significantly negative, not positive.
In view of the existing empirical evidence, the
employee learning theory seems more plausible.
According to that theory firms make employees rotate
so that they acquire new skills. If employees with less
tenure have comparatively less human capital, they
should rotate more. This would explain the negative
correlation between tenure and rotation. Consider,
however, the predictions of this theory regarding
innovation. First of all, if a company undertakes con-
tinuous innovation, it is not clear that low-tenure
employees will have more need to learn than high-
tenure employees: On one hand, a large proportion of
the human capital that high-tenure employees accu-
mulated might have lost its value; on the other hand,
newly hired employees might have learned many
of the new skills that are required in the firm at
school. Hence, it is not clear that in innovative firms
tenure and rotation should be negatively correlated.
Finally, consider a comparison between innovative
and noninnovative companies. It is beyond doubt that
an innovative company will have a greater need to
induce its employees to learn. However, why should
rotation be the right way to induce such learning? If
substantial innovation is being undertaken, then each
employee will learn new skills even if he does not
rotate. The idea behind the employee learning theory
is that employees should change jobs when they have
already learned enough about their old job. How-
ever, if a company has just introduced a new tech-
nology, employees might need more time to learn all
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they need to learn about their current job, and it will
take them more time to be ready to rotate. We should
then expect innovation and rotation to be negatively
correlated.
The explanation based on firm learning seems to
be able to accommodate the two pieces of empir-
ical evidence at the same time: As we have seen,
the advantage of a rotation policy over a specializa-
tion policy increases as prior uncertainty regarding
employees and activities increases. This means that
it is more profitable for the firm to rotate employ-
ees with low rather than high tenure and that rota-
tion is more profitable in more innovative activities.
When firms are very innovative, employees would
learn a lot even if they did not change jobs. However,
these firms prefer to have them rotate because in
this way the firms can better learn how well suited
different persons are to different activities. On the
other hand, firm learning would also explain why
high-tenure employees rotate less even though they
are more likely to be less motivated: The firm simply
does not need to learn much about them.
Acknowledgments
The auhor is grateful to Maury Gittleman for providing unpub-
lished results obtained for his paper with Michael Horrigan
and Mary Joyce (Gittleman et al. 1998). He would also like to
thank Susan Athey, Bengt Holmstrom, seminar participants at CLS
(University of Aarhus and Aarhus Business School), IZA (Bonn),
and SITE (Stockholm School of Economics), Departmental Editor
Linda Argote, an anonymous associate editor, and two anonymous
referees.
Appendix
General Updating Formula
Subsequent results in this appendix make use of the following sta-
tistical result:
Lemma 3. Let y1 = L
 + 1, where 1 ∼ N0G−11  and 
 ∼
N
0H
−1
0 ; y1, 
, and 1 are n× 1, m× 1, and m× 1 vectors (respec-
tively); L is an m× n matrix; and G1 and H0 are symmetric m×m
and n× n (respectively) matrices. Then the posterior distribution of 

conditional on y1 is N
1H−11 , where

1= H0+L′G1L−1H0
0+L′G1y1
H1=H0+L′G1L
(11)
Proof. The proof is standard and is ommitted for the sake of
concision. This result is a generalization of the theorem in §16.4.1
(pp. 382–383) of Pratt et al. (1995).
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that S (Expression (4) in §2.2) is
proportional to the expected value of a truncated normal variable.
The coefficient of proportionality is 1/2:
S =
1
2
(
E0!E2
A1+
B2"+2#0
√
V0!E2
A1+
B2"
)
= 2−1/2√V0!E2
A1+
B2" (12)
where #· is the density function of a standard univariate normal
variable and Vt· is the variance operator conditional on all infor-
mation available at the end of period t.
Second, for any normal random variable x with E0x = 0 we
can prove that V0!E2x"= V0x−V2x. Letting It denote all infor-
mation available at the end of period t, and using (a) the law of
iterated expectations and (b) the fact that, ex ante, the variance of
a posterior normal variable is not a random variable, we have
V0!E2x" = V!ExI2I0"= E!ExI22I0"−E!ExI2I0"2
= E!ExI22I0"−ExI02 = E!ExI22I0"
= E!Ex2I2−VxI2I0"
= E!Ex2I2I0"−E!V xI2I0"
= Ex2I0−VxI2= VxI0−VxI2
= V0x−V2x (13)
Third, by assumption we have V0
A1+
B2= 2 2
 .
Fourth, we can use Lemma 3 to compute the posterior variance
in the specialization case:
V2
A1+
B2=
2 2

2
 
2
 
2


2
 +2 2
 2 
 2

2
 +2 2
 2  2  2 +2 2
 2 −4 4
 4
 (14)
Finally, combining these results gives Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 2. To find the value of job rotation we use
Afonja (1972), which provides an explicit solution: If x = x1x2 is
a bivariate normal variable with Ex1= Ex2=m and Vx= ij 
(for i j ∈ 12), then the expectation of the maximum is
E!maxx"=m+ 2−1/2√11+22−212 (15)
Now defining yAB = E2
A1+ 1+
B2+ 2 and yBA = E2
B1+ 1+

A2+2, we have
R = 2−1/2
√
V0yAB−yBA (16)
By symmetry, V0yAB = V0yBA. Furthermore, applying (13),
we have V0yAB = V0
A1 + 1 + 
B2 + 2−V2
A1 + 1 + 
B2 + 2
and cov0yAByBA = cov0
A1+ 1+
B2+ 2
B1+ 1+
A2+ 2 −
cov2
A1 + 1 +
B2 + 2
B1 + 1 +
A2 + 2, where covt   is the
covariance operator conditional on all information available at the
end of period t.
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Given our distributional assumptions, we have V0
A1 + 1 +

B2 + 2 = 2 2
 + 2 2 . Moreover, Bayesian updating gives the fol-
lowing expressions for the posterior variance and covariance:
V2
A1+1+
B2+2=
2 2
[
 2 
2

+ 2 + 2
 2
+2 2 
]
 2
+ 2  2
+ 2 +2 2 
 (17)
cov2
A1+1+
B2+2
B1+1+
A2+2
= 2
2
 
4

 2
+ 2  2
+ 2 +2 2 
 (18)
Combining these results, we get
V0yAB−yBA=
 4

 2
+ 2
(19)
and Lemma 2 follows. 
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemmas 1 and 2, the difference in
profits between a job rotation and a specialiation policies is
=
√
2

[(
 4

 2 + 2

)1/2
−
(
 4

 2 +2 2
+2 2
)1/2]
 (20)
The proof that  > 0 is straightforward. To prove the rest of the
proposition, it suffices to differentiate with respect to  2 , 
2

 , and
 2 . Differentiating with respect to 
2
 , we find
(
( 2
=
√
1
2
 2

[
 2 +2 2
+2 2 −3/2−  2
+ 2 −3/2
]
< 0 (21)
Differentiation with respect to  2
 yields
(R
( 2

=
√
1
2
 2
+2 2
 2
+ 2 3/2
(22)
and
(S
( 2

=
√
2

 2 + 2
+2 2
 2 +2 2
+2 2 3/2
 (23)
Letting *=  2
/ 2 and +=  2 / 2 , we have
(R
( 2

>
(S
( 2

⇔
(
*+2
*+2++1
)2( 2*+2++1
*+1
)3
> 4
⇔ *+222*+2++13−4*+2++12*+13 > 0
⇔ 4*5+8*4++3+8+2++12+2*34+2+28++23
+8*4+3+12+2+7++1
+*28+3+6+2+102++33 > 0 (24)
which is satisfied. Hence  is increasing in  2
 .
Finally, differentiation with respect to  2 gives us the following
result:
(
( 2
=− (S
( 2
=
√
2

 2
(
 2 +2 2
+2 2
)3/2 > 0  (25)
Proofs for the Correlated Case
The procedure to find the value of each job allocation policy is
similar to the one followed for the uncorrelated case. We use
Lemma 3 to compute the posterior variances and then use Afonja’s
(1972) result (Equation (15)) to compute the expected value of each
allocation policy.
The proof that > 0 is straightforward. The comparative statics
are obtained by differentiation. First of all,  is clearly increasing
in  2 : R does not depend on 
2
 and S is decreasing in 
2
 .
Second, differentiation with respect to  2 yields
(R
( 2
= −
√
1
2
 2
−
 2 + 2
−3/2
and
(S
( 2
= −
√
1
2
 2
−
 2 +2 2
+2 2 3/2

Comparison of these two results shows that  is decreasing in  2 .
Third, differentiation with respect to  2
 yields
(R
( 2

=
√
2

 2 + 12  2
−
 2 + 2
−3/2
and
(S
( 2

=
√
2

 2 + 2
+2 2 +
 2 +2 2
+2 2 3/2

Hence,
(R
( 2

>
(S
( 2

⇔ 2+ 1−,*
1+2++ 1+,*
(
1+2*+2+
1+ 1−,*
)3/2
> 2
⇔ !2+ 1−,*"21+2*+2+3
−4!1+2++ 1+,*"2!1+ 1−,*"3 > 0
where *=  2
/ 2 , +=  2 / 2 , and ,= / 2
 .
This inequality can be rewritten as follows:
8+1+2+2+*2(33+8+31−,2+12+21−,5+3,
−,10−9,+6+!17−,2−,")
+4*51−,21−,+,2+,3
+2*3(23+4+21−,21+2,−,!18− 15−4,,"
+4+1−,7+,+4,2)
+4*41−,(6+2+1−,1+2,2−,!4−,5+,")
+8*(1++!7+,+4+3++−+,")> 0
We have decomposed the right-hand side of the inequality into six
terms, all of which can be shown to be positive using the fact that
0< , < 1.
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Finally, differentiation with respect to  shows that
(R
(
=−
√
2

 2 + 12  2
−
 2 + 2
−3/2
and
(S
(
=−
√
2

1
 2 +2 2
+2 2 1/2

Rearranging terms and using the definitions for *, +, and ,, we
find
(R
(
<
(S
(
⇔ 1
4
(
2+ 1−,*
1+ 1−,*
)2
>
1+ 1−,*
1+2*+2+ 
The left-hand side of the inequality is monotonically increasing in
, and the right-hand side is monotonically decreasing in ,. At ,=
1 the left-hand side is greater than the right-hand side, and  is
decreasing in ,. On the other hand, at ,= 0 the left-hand side might
be greater or smaller than the right-hand side, depending on the
values of the parameters.
Hence  might be monotonically decreasing in  or might have
an inverted U shape with respect to  . 
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